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Donald Davidson’s work gives central place to a primitive concept of objective 
truth. Elements of his epistemology, however, make accounting for our possession of 
this concept difficult. In order to provide such an account, Davidson introduced the 
notion of triangulation. In the current paper, I discuss the three contexts in which 
triangulation occurs: ostensive learning, normal linguistic communication, and radical 
interpretation. My thesis is that triangulation came to transform Davidson’s view of 
radical interpretation in the process of thinking about the details of ostensive learning 
and linguistic communication, and this view is Davidson’s final account of the concept 
of objective truth. 
Below, I being by reviewing the background necessary for making sense of 
Davidson’s introduction and uses of triangulation. Next, I contrast basic triangulation—
that which can and does occur with creatures that lack thought and language—with 
Davidson’s later discussions of triangulation in the context of ostensive learning. I 
also look at normal linguistic communication and radical interpretation in light of the 
account of ostensive learning (all three involving linguistic triangulation). Finally, I 
apply the distinction between basic and linguistic triangulation to radical interpretation 
in giving my take on Davidson’s final solution to the problem of objectivity. 
Davidson is a non-reductionist about mind and language. His proposal is to give 
non-intentionally specified necessary, but not jointly sufficient, conditions for the 
emergence of thought. In particular, Davidson maintained from early in his career 
that the concepts of belief, truth, and error are interrelated and cannot be reduced to 
either the non-intentional or to concepts simpler or more basic. Our understanding of 
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these concepts comes in our awareness of their relations to one another and to the sorts 
of evidence we have for their application. Moreover, conceptual content requires 
such concepts and inherits its normative features from occurring in judgments along 
with possible error. Error allows for the distinction between belief and truth and gets 
its grip in the context of interpretation. To provide a non-reductive account of the 
emergence of thought and language therefore requires a non-intentionally specifiable 
set of conditions necessary for the emergence of determinate mental content along with 
the concepts of belief, truth, and error, as well as linguistic communication.  
Triangulation is best seen as the framework that makes possible the emergence of 
thought and language and the concepts necessary for that emergence. 
The roots of triangulation can be traced to the debate between Davidson and W. V. O. 
Quine over the location of the stimulus that provides the interpretation of observation 
sentences in radical interpretation.1) Quine favors proximal stimulation of the sense 
organs because of its avoidance of error. This starting point is appropriate for his 
epistemic goal of accounting for how people come to have a theory of the world—
along with the reification of objects—from the paltry evidence provided by their 
proximal stimuli. Davidson rejects the notion of proximal, mediating, non-conceptual 
evidence. Simply put, causes of beliefs are not reasons for beliefs.2) While objects 
in the world cause our beliefs, Davidson rejects any foundationalist picture according 
to which we can compare our beliefs with their causes so as to provide evidence or 
reasons for those beliefs.  Only beliefs (things with propositional content) can serve as 
evidence for beliefs.3) 
                                                                 
1) Davidson, D. (1982) “Empirical Content.” In Davidson, D. (2001) Subjective, Intersubjective, 
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But this rejection of foundationalism led to two related problems for Davidson, 
the problems of error and objectivity. The problem of error is making sense of 
attributing error in the context of interpretation on the basis of distal stimuli; if distal 
stimuli determine both the meaning attributed and the truth of the belief attributed 
(since meaning is cashed out in terms of truth conditions), speakers will always be 
right—which means there is no wrong, and so the idea of being right or wrong, and so 
the idea of truth, gets no grip.4) The problem of objectivity concerns how to account 
for our concept of truth as independent of belief, given access to nothing outside our 
own web of beliefs, beliefs that are directly about the objects that make them true (as 
opposed to representational states that mediate mind and world).5) 
Two theses are of particular importance for Davidson’s work on objectivity.
The first is the causal thesis, according to which the objects that cause speakers to hold 
true observation sentences determine the content of those sentences.6) The importance 
of this thesis is seen in Davidson’s claim that a solution to the problem of objectivity 
will not be found in an epistemic account of objectivity—in the sense of comparisons 
of beliefs with the outside world—but rather in a semantic account of the causal role of 
objects in interpretation.7) Davidson suggests that while a believer cannot compare 
his or her own beliefs with their causes, an interpreter of the speech of that believer 
must take into account the causes of the believer holding sentences true.  An 
understanding of interpretation should therefore give us an understanding of what 
makes possible our concept of objectivity. Triangulation, as we will see, makes this 
basic causal relation possible. 
                                                                 
4) Davidson, Donald (1999) “Reply to Follesdal.” In The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Hahn (ed.), 
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The second thesis relevant to solving the problem of objectivity is Davidson’s 
rejection of linguistic conventions as playing a necessary or constitutive role in 
linguistic meaning.8) With this rejection we lose any hope of making sense of error 
and objectivity in terms of the practices of linguistic communities. The rejection of 
conventions led to Davidson proposing his own account of communication.
According to that account, the norm of communication is a function of the intentions 
of speakers to be interpreted in the way intended, and the listener providing the speaker 
with some indication of the success or failure of this intention. Linguistic normativity 
is provided by the notion of going on as before, Davidson’s substitute for the notion of 
following a shared rule.9) In communication, the speaker intends to go on as before in 
the use of language, and the listener provides the normative check on the success of 
this intention. Triangulation makes possible both the causal determination of content 
and going on as before. 
My interpretation of how this works is perhaps made clearer by contrasting it with 
the prevailing interpretation among commentators on triangulation. In contrast to 
those interpretations according to which triangulation is a common-cause account of 
content, I suggest that the common cause is picked out by triangulation. That is, there 
is no “the object” that we can say, independently of and prior to triangulation, that will 
be “the cause” of the responses of triangulating creatures. As is well known from 
discussions in the philosophy of science concerning the pragmatics of causal 
explanations, “the cause” of an event often depends on our explanatory interests. In 
essence, these explanatory interests are on Davidson’s account built into creatures like 
us; we need to know what objects others are responding to, and so we are born 
discerning what those objects are. Moreover, we are born responding to objects in 
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ways that reveal what objects we find similar; Davidson calls theses responses 
similarity responses.  I claim then that triangulation is best understood as the 
convergence of inborn shared similarity responses of two creatures on a single object.  
Figure 1 illustrates this. 
 
Figure 1 Triangulation  
 
The arrows within the triangle represent the inborn standards of similarity of each 
creature as metaphorically reaching out to an object. Because the creatures share 
such similarity standards, the same objects are found similar by both creatures. As a 
result, that object and objects found similar to that object cause the similarity responses 
of each creature—represented by the arrows outside the triangle.  Finally, by 
correlating objects found similar and responses of the other found similar, a distinction 
between objects found similar and objects that are in fact similar is made possible.
This distinction is necessary for determinate content, and for distinguishing between 
mere discrimination and concept possession, since it makes for a distinction between 
things in the extension of a concept and things that seem or appear to be in the 
extension. 
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The necessity of language for error and conceptual content depends on 
Davidson’s view that to have a concept of error requires the ability to give reasons and 
explain errors. Concepts inherit their normativity from judgments in which they 
occur, judgments to the effect that an object in question belongs to a certain class.
Such judgments require the awareness of possible error.  Davidson’s early 
discussions of triangulation concerned such judgments and the necessity of the 
linguistic communication of the content of such concepts for the concept of objectivity.
Davidson’s later discussions of triangulation are concerned with the way in which 
triangulation makes possible error in the breakdown of correlations between objects 
found similar and the similarity responses of the other creature. Such breakdowns are 
not sufficient for the concept of error, but they do provide space for the application of a 
concept of error. To have this concept requires not only the awareness of error but 
also the ability to explain error by means of linguistic communication.10) Concept 
possession therefore requires language use in the giving of reasons for judgments and 
reasons for error. Concepts find their home in the practice of reason giving and so 
resist reduction or naturalization. 
How does triangulation make possible the linguistic communication necessary for 
such sophisticated practices? Here, we must bring together Davidson’s idolectic 
account of communication with triangulation as it occurs in ostensive language 
learning. Reflection on ostensive learning resulted in a shift in Davidson’s view of 
interpretation; the consequence is Davidson’s final account of objectivity. Figure 2 
illustrates the analogous way in which ostension figures in ostensive language learning, 
interpretation, and linguistic communication. 
  
                                                                 
10) Davidson, Donald (1999) “Reply to Follesdal.” In The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Hahn (ed.), 
Open Court, p. 730. 
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Figure 2 Ostension 
 
Consider first ostensive language learning. The adult says a word and points to 
an object; this is the arrow at the top of the triangle indicating the adult’s old or 
preexisting language. The inborn similarity standards shared by adult and child allow 
for the triangulation of the object; both find the object to belong to the same class, and 
the child finds the spoken word to belong to a class. The child then imitates the adult, 
responding similarly when the child encounters objects found similar to the originally 
ostended object.  This is the child’s new bit of language—the bottom arrow 
representing this correlation—and the adult provides the normative check—the arrow 
on the left—as to whether the child has gone on as before or is in error. The result, 
often enough, is that the new language of the child resembles the old language of the 
adult and so allows for increasingly sophisticated communication and so the 
emergence of language and thought. 
Next, consider linguistic communication. Davidson does not consider ostension 
in connection with his characterization of communication, for the obvious reason that 
ostension does not typically occur in linguistic communication. Nevertheless, the 
other elements of the triangle are present in his account. According to that account, 
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communication requires that a speaker make himself interpretable to a listener. In 
particular, the speaker must intend to be interpreted in a certain way; the speaker must 
believe that the listener will be able to recognize this intention; and the speaker must 
be justified in this belief.  The connection between ostensive learning (and 
triangulation) and Davidson’s idolectic characterization of communication is provided 
by the notion of going on as before. If the listener is to interpret the speaker correctly, 
the listener must form correct expectations as to how the speaker will go on. The 
speaker, therefore, must intend to go on in a certain way, intend the listener to 
recognize this intention, and be justified in believing the listener recognizes this 
intention. We can now ask the question: In virtue of what are the responses of the 
speaker relevantly similar? Davidson’s answer is that the responses are similar in 
virtue of the responses of the other creature. That is, the responses of the speaker are 
similar—the speaker goes on as before—as determined by the responses of the listener.  
The listener therefore provides the normative check for the speaker. If we consider 
the case of a malapropism, the analogy with ostensive learning becomes clearer. The 
speaker uses a word in an unusual way. The listener is able to infer the intended 
meaning given contextual clues and background knowledge (this is triangulation in an 
extended sense, and would be in the literal sense if an ostended object were involved).
The speaker goes on in the same way in this non-standard use of the word, and the 
listener continues to give it the non-standard interpretation. The speaker has, in a 
sense, created a new language, but as long as the speaker goes on in the same way, the 
listener is able to assign the interpretation intended by the speaker. Whether or not 
the speaker has gone on in the same way is determined by the responses of the listener. 
Finally, consider the case of radical interpretation.  The native utters an 
observation sentence in the presence of an object. The interpreter imitates the 
utterance and goes on to produce similar utterances in the presence of objects found 
similar. As in ostensive learning, though, the original pairing for the interpreter is 
sight and sound; what the native or the native’s community mean by such utterances is 
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irrelevant. A sound is being given a use, and the process of ostension establishes this 
use. Subsequent utterances of similar sounds by the interpreter will have as their 
content objects relevantly similar to the object involved in the original ostension. The 
correctness (relevant similarity11)) of the interpreter’s utterances over time will be 
determined by the responses of the native. In this way, the interpreter has learned a 
new language, one modeled on the language of the native. 
The significance of ostension becomes clear if we think of radical interpretation 
as having two stages corresponding to basic triangulation and linguistic triangulation.
In the first, non-normative stage, the native utters a word or phrase and gestures to an 
object. The shared similarity standards of interpreter and native pick out the same 
object, and the object then serves as the standard of comparison of subsequent 
responses of the interpreter. For this reason, doubt in the case of the original 
ostension is impossible; the original pairing is a non-normative, causal association for 
the interpreter. In the next stage, the interpreter responds to the object with a sound 
similar to the utterance of the native, though this similarity is not necessary. What is 
necessary is that the interpreter go on as before, meaning that whatever response he 
makes to the object, he responds similarly to objects found similar in the future.
Similar, of course, in the eyes of the native. The responses of the native then serve as 
a check on whether the interpreter is succeeding in going on as before. The second 
stage of ostension therefore introduces an element of normativity by making error 
possible. In this way, the interpreter comes to speak a new language of his own, but 
one that because it is modeled on that of the native will serve for the purposes of 
linguistic communication. 
With this two stage view of interpretation we have Davidson’s solutions to both 
the problems of error and objectivity. The first ostension lacks normativity and the 
                                                                 
11) Davidson, D. (2001) “Externalisms.” In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, G. Segal (Eds.), Interpreting Davidson 
(pp. 1-16). Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
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object ostended comes to play a constitutive role in the content of what will be the 
interpreter’s future verbal responses. The importance of this for objectivity is that 
while neither native nor interpreter can compare their beliefs with what cause them, a 
brute causal relation between native and object grounds the content the interpreter’s 
responses will come to have. A standard of objectivity is therefore made possible by 
both the original object ostended and also the inborn similarity responses shared by 
native and interpreter that determine what objects are relevantly similar to the original 
object. With the second stage we see how error is made possible. Relative to the 
original ostension, the native’s responses serve as a check on the responses of the 
interpreter. When the interpreter makes a mistake in the eyes of the native, the 
native’s response serves to indicate that the current object is not relevantly similar to 
the originally ostended object or that the current response is not relevantly similar to 
the interpreter’s past responses. Both the object and the native provide essential 
elements in the objective standard against which the interpreter’s responses are 
measured. 
Here, then, is my interpretation of Davidson’s final account of our concept of 
objectivity—of a world independent of our beliefs about it—as it arises in a semantic 
rather than an epistemic context. The following steps are involved: 
1. The original ostension by the parent/native picks out an object as salient. 
2. The response of the child/interpreter establishes a relation between responses and 
the originally ostended object. 
3. Responses of the adult/native to the responses of the child/interpreter provide the 
check on whether or not the child/interpreter is going on as before. 
4. The object then plays the role of what is constant for both individuals against which 
the check on response similarity makes sense. 
5. So, we get a notion of objectivity: objects are independent of the responses of the 
creatures triangulating them. 
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Davidson’s claim, then, is that our concept of objective truth arises in understanding 
the role of the world in interpreting one another. Understood as a convergence of 
shared inborn similarity responses, triangulation is the scaffolding that supports the 
emergence of this concept of objective truth, as well as thought and language. With 
that emergence, we come to engage in the practices of reason giving and error 
explanation, practices that are on Davidson’s view ineliminable elements of what it is 
to be a rational animal. 
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